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Visual imagery has been closely linked to brain mechanisms involved in perception. Can
visual imagery, like visual perception, improve by means of training? Previous research has
demonstrated that people can reliably evaluate the vividness of single episodes of imag-
ination – might the metacognition of imagery also improve over the course of training?
We had participants imagine colored Gabor patterns for an hour a day, over the course of
five consecutive days, and again 2 weeks after training. Participants rated the subjective
vividness and effort of their mental imagery on each trial. The influence of imagery on
subsequent binocular rivalry dominance was taken as our measure of imagery strength.
We found no overall effect of training on imagery strength. Training did, however, improve
participant’s metacognition of imagery. Trial-by-trial ratings of vividness gained predictive
power on subsequent rivalry dominance as a function of training. These data suggest
that, while imagery strength might be immune to training in the current context, people’s
metacognitive understanding of mental imagery can improve with practice.
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INTRODUCTION
Mental imagery can be described as the retrieval of perceptual
information from memory, and the subsequent examination of
this information in the “minds eye.” Research has provided a
growing body of behavioral and neuroimaging evidence that
there is considerable overlap between the “minds eye” and actual
perception (Chen et al., 1998; Kreiman et al., 2000; O’Craven
and Kanwisher, 2000; Zatorre and Halpern, 2005). For exam-
ple, behavioral studies have demonstrated that imagery content
can selectively influence perception (Perky, 1910; McDermott and
Roediger, 1994; Pearson et al., 2008). Imagery has been shown to
affect visual detection thresholds (Ishai and Sagi, 1997), perfor-
mance on a visual acuity task (Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1992),
and to induce negative aftereffects (Gilden et al., 1995) in much the
same way as a sensory stimulus. Recent neuroimaging studies show
that there is considerable spatial overlap between activated areas
of the brain during both visual perception and visual imagery, for
example information about a pattern held in mind during work-
ing memory or imagery can be present in visual sensory cortex
(Kosslyn et al., 1995; Slotnick et al., 2005; Harrison and Tong,
2009; Serences et al., 2009; Stokes et al., 2009). Like perception,
visual imagery is impaired when visual cortical activity is dis-
turbed by means of transcranial magnetic stimulation (Kosslyn
et al., 1999).
If visual imagery can indeed be defined as the recreation of
a perceptual representation in the absence of retinal input (Ishai
and Sagi, 1995), one may wonder exactly how similar imagery is
to perception. Specifically, prolonged visual practice can improve
perceptual skill (Fahle and Poggio, 2002; Fine and Jacobs, 2002;
Sasaki et al., 2010); can imagery also improve with daily prac-
tice? There is some evidence to suggest that perceptual learning
can occur from training without physical stimulation. Repeti-
tively imagining the crucial part of a visual bisection stimulus
(visual spatial judgment) or imagining a low-contrast Gabor
pattern (contrast judgment) can improve performance on sub-
sequent perceptual tasks (Tartaglia et al., 2009). Similarly, imag-
ining motor-acts facilitates performance on corresponding tasks
by training relevant parts of motor cortex, and by strengthen-
ing associations between processes and actions (Driskell et al.,
1994; Weiss et al., 1994; Feltz and Landers, 2007). To date,
research has mainly focused on the effects imagery training
has on subsequent perceptual tasks. Here, we look directly at
the influence of imagery training on the strength of imagery
itself.
One of the hallmarks of mental imagery is the considerable
difference in reported imagery strength and vividness observed
across individuals (Galton, 1883; McKellar, 1965; Marks, 1973;
Amedi et al., 2005; Cui et al., 2007). Some individuals claim
veridical, vivid imagery, while others doubt its entire existence
(McKellar, 1965). The factors causing such differences in imagery
strength remain largely unknown. One hypothesis is that individ-
uals who actively practice, or whose everyday activities involve
strong use of imagery, might have strengthened their imagery
through training and practice (Sacks, 2010). We sought to exam-
ine such a proposal in the lab by engaging individuals in
an imagery task daily, over a period of 5 days. Can repeated
instances of forming visual imagery lead to improved imagery
strength?
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To address this question researchers must be able to reli-
ably measure imagery strength from 1 day to the next. Previous
work demonstrated that sustained imagery has a pronounced
and visually specific impact on subsequent perception (Pearson
et al., 2008, 2011). These studies utilized a visual phenomenon
called binocular rivalry; when two different patterns are pre-
sented one to each eye, only one of the patterns is consciously
perceived. Subtle experimental manipulations, such as attention
(Meng and Tong, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2004; Chong and Blake,
2006; Kamphuisen et al., 2007), sensory memory (Pearson and
Brascamp, 2008), or imagery (Pearson et al., 2008), can bring about
a slight imbalance in the neural states, creating a bias that helps
one pattern win the race for dominance at the expense of the
other.
We have previously demonstrated that imagery can alter future
competitive visual interactions in favor of the imagined stimulus
on a large percentage of trials (Pearson et al., 2008, 2011), while
catch-trial presentations of mock rivalry stimuli do not reveal such
bias, ruling out the possibility of demand characteristics (Pylyshyn,
2003). Indeed, scores on offline imagery questionnaires predict
imagery strength measured using rivalry (Pearson et al., 2011) and
rivalry has been utilized to examine the role of imagery during
visual working memory (Keogh and Pearson, 2011). Thus, there is
compelling evidence that rivalry bias (or“perceptual bias”) is a use-
ful way to measure imagery strength in general (e.g., encompassing
perceptual elements and sensations of vividness). In the current
study, imagery strength is the underlying construct of interest,
and the extent to which imagery biases perception is taken as a
reliable measure of imagery strength. The subjective experiences
associated with imagery strength are probed by having participants
report the “vividness” of their mental images.
Can people evaluate the phenomenal qualities of internally
generated experiences, such as whether a mental image is vivid
or detailed? Recently, an attempt was made to answer the ques-
tion of knowing ones own thoughts (exemplifying the problem
of “metacognition;” Flavell, 1979) in relation to mental imagery
(Pearson et al., 2011). This study provided compelling new evi-
dence that people have accurate metacognitive knowledge at
fine-grained scale, regarding specific instances of imagery: On
individual trials, higher ratings of imagery vividness predicted a
greater likelihood that the imagined pattern would appear domi-
nant during subsequent rivalry (Pearson et al., 2011). Interestingly,
repeated attempts to form a particular visual image can lead to dif-
ferent degrees of success with each try, causing imagery strength
to fluctuate from one moment to the next. Despite this variance in
imagery strength, people demonstrate good metacognitive under-
standing of their imagery, and can readily evaluate how vivid their
mental images are on a particular occasion.
At a general level, there has been a growing interest in metacog-
nitive judgments of memory and sensory decision-making (Kiani
and Shadlen, 2009; Fleming et al., 2010; Rounis et al., 2010; Song
et al., 2011). Frontal brain regions are important for introspec-
tive or metacognitive ability (Kepecs et al., 2008; Fleming et al.,
2010), which suggests that the neural substrates of metacogni-
tive ability are distinct from those supporting primary perception.
Although the ability to introspect varies substantially across indi-
viduals, within a single individual metacognitive ability seems to
be stable and task independent, suggesting a common cognitive
process (Song et al., 2011).
Little is known regarding the stability and independence of
metacognition of mental imagery. If metacognition for percep-
tual tasks originates from a common cognitive process, might
a similar process allow people to have metacognition of mental
imagery? Despite the highly subjective and volitional nature of
imagery, people are reasonably good at imagery metacognition
(Pearson et al., 2011). Is this ability stable, or might metacognition
of imagery improve with repeated practice? Here, we also investi-
gated the degree of imagery metacognition as a function of daily
training.
To assess metacognition we use a method derived from signal
detection theory (Swets, 1986; Macmillan and Creelman, 1991;
Galvin et al., 2003; Kornbrot, 2006) that has been successfully
employed in a variety of recent metacognition studies (Fleming
et al., 2010; Song et al., 2011). Using this method, we looked at the
likelihood that imagery biased subsequent rivalry, given a certain
level of imagery vividness. Signal detection allows us to estimate a
single quantitative “sensitivity” measure of metacognitive ability,
derived from these objective (amount of perceptual bias) and sub-
jective (ratings of vividness) variables. This measure of sensitivity
is criterion free, which means that it is not prone to changes in cri-
terion (rating-magnitude), and it is not affected by irregular use
of the rating scale (which generally results in unequal numbers of
observations across the various conditions).
By way of preview, here we report that imagery strength – mea-
sured as the extent to which imagery biases perception during
binocular rivalry – did not increase over the 5-day training period.
Interestingly, participant’s metacognition of imagery did signifi-
cantly improve over the training period. This dissociation between
imagery strength and metacognitive ability suggests a degree of
independence between the two processes.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Nine observers (six female) participated in the experiment. All had
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal stere-
ovision, and all provided written informed consent. Observers
received payment for their participation ($10 per hour, plus a $5
per hour bonus upon completion) with the exception of a partici-
pating author (RR) and participant BW. The study was carried out
with the approval of the Institutional Review Board at Vanderbilt
University.
MATERIALS
Observers viewed the stimuli on a luminance-calibrated CRT
monitor with 1152× 870 resolution and a 75-Hz refresh rate in
an otherwise darkened room. Visual stimuli were generated with
Matlab 7.5.0 (R2007b) and the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997) under Mac OSX. Observers sat at a viewing
distance of 56 cm, and used a chinrest to maintain a stable head
position. A mirror stereoscope was used to present a different pat-
tern to each eye, and binocular convergence of the two images was
aided by a white bull’s eye fixation dot (0.95˚) at the center of each
monocular half-image. Participants were instructed to maintain
steady fixation throughout all experimental trials.
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Rivalry stimuli consisted of a green and a red grating (spatial
frequency= 1.23 c/˚) surrounding a central fixation point, pre-
sented against a black background with a mean luminance of
0.09 cd/m2. CIE color values of the stimuli were as follows – green:
x= 0.293, y= 0.572; red: x= 0.602, y= 0.353. Gratings were pre-
sented at 75% contrast and had a Gaussian-shaped luminance
profile (mean luminance= 6.95 cd/m2) that faded to black at the
stimulus edge (Gaussian σ= 4.29˚). Five observers were trained
with a green grating of orientation 112.5˚ and a red grating
of orientation 22.5˚, while on generalization blocks they were
presented with 67.5˚ green, and 157.5˚ red gratings. The oppo-
site was true for the remaining four observers, meaning that
we counterbalanced which grating-pairs were used for training
and generalization between participants. On catch trials, a mock
rivalry stimulus was presented consisting of a physical blend
of the green and red rivalry patterns. This stimulus was pre-
sented to both eyes simultaneously in order to avoid interocular
competition. Presentation of the mock-stimulus allowed us to
test for decisional bias and demand characteristics (Landsberger,
1958).
The dominant eye plays a key role in determining which of
two monocular images is likely to be perceived at the onset of
binocular rivalry. Therefore, individual fine-tuning of stimulus
contrast was done before the start of the experiment, and before
each daily session, to control for differences in ocular dominance
between observers. We used the same procedure as in previous
research (Pearson et al., 2008, 2011; Keogh and Pearson, 2011),
matching the relative strength of the rivalry gratings to the point
at which perceptual competition is most balanced, and thus most
susceptible to disruption.
PROCEDURE
To investigate whether visual imagery can be improved by means
of training, and to see how this relates to metacognition of imagery
over time, we had observers perform a visual imagery task on five
consecutive days, for about an hour a day. A sixth follow-up ses-
sion was conducted 2–3 weeks after training. Participants came
into the lab at or around the same time on each day of training,
and were dark-adapted for a couple of minutes before the start of
each experimental session.
During the experiment,participants were briefly presented with
a randomly chosen (equal number of both) central cue (“G” for
green, or “R” for red) at the beginning of each imagery-trial
(Figure 1A). Subsequently, participants would engage in visual
imagery of the cued pattern for an 8-s period. After completing
this imagery period, the word “vividness?” cued participants to
first report the quality of their imagery by means of left-handed
button presses (1= almost no imagery, 2= some weak imagery,
3=moderate imagery, 4= strong imagery almost like perception),
after which they were cued by the word “effort?” to report the
amount of vigor with which they had tried to imagine the pattern
(1= almost no effort, 2= some effort, 3=moderate effort, 4= tried
very hard to form a mental image). Observers were instructed to
use the full range of the rating scale to the best of their abilities.
As soon as a participant had responded to both questions, a
rivalry display (90% of trials) or a mock display (10% of trials)
was presented for 750 ms. On rivalry trials, the green grating was
presented to the left eye, and the red grating to the right eye. On
mock trials, the plaid-stimulus was presented to both eyes simul-
taneously. Participants reported which image had appeared most
dominant, by pressing one of three buttons (1= green, 2=mixed,
3= red). For this response, the right hand was used in order to
minimize potential response conflict between the two hands. A
“mixed” response could be made on all trials (rivalry and mock
trials). On rivalry trials, the observer could give a mixed response
in case he or she was unable to distinguish which grating had
appeared more dominant due to binocular combination or piece-
meal rivalry. This type of mixed percept was reported on 6.49% of
rivalry trials (SEM= 2.49%).
A single training session consisted of two blocks of 70 trials
each. Within each block, seven catch trials were randomly inter-
leaved between the rivalry trials. We tested potential generalization
of learning to non-trained orientations on day 1 and 5 of train-
ing, and during follow-up. On these days, observers performed
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FIGURE 1 | Sample trial sequence and example ROC II curve. (A)
Participants were presented with a random cue (“G” or “R”) after which they
formed a mental image of the green or red grating over an 8-s period.
Participants were then cued to report the vividness of the imagined item, and
the effort exerted while imagining the item, on an absolute scale from 1 to 4.
After a brief flash of the rivalry display, participants reported which grating had
appeared perceptually dominant, or whether their percept was an equal mix
of the two. On 10% of the trials – instead of the rivalry display – a
mock-stimulus was presented to both eyes simultaneously, consisting of a
physical combination of both the green and red grating. (B) To determine how
well subjective ratings predict perceptual bias, type II ROC sensitivity was
calculated by taking the area under the ROC curve (Aroc). This area is the sum
of the area of the half-square triangle (dark-gray shaded region) and the area
between the diagonal and the ROC function (light-gray shaded region).
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twice the amount of trials, with training and generalization blocks
presented separately and in a randomized order.
ANALYSES
To assess the strength of visual imagery, we looked at the per-
ceptual facilitation (or bias) of imagery on rivalry. This was
calculated as the percentage of trials in which the imagined grat-
ing matched subsequent perception during rivalry (Pearson et al.,
2008), excluding trials on which a mixed percept was reported. A
perceptual bias greater than 50% (chance) on the rivalry trials but
not on the catch trials suggests facilitation due to imagery con-
tent. Due to experimenter error, a small number of runs (7 out
of 108) were missing from the data. Where necessary, we used tri-
linear interpolation to infer the mean percentage of bias. For the
day-by-day analysis (Figure 2) only one data point was interpo-
lated (percentage perceptual bias for participant CB on day 4); the
session-by-session analysis of the same data required interpolation
of all seven missing runs.
Data obtained from subjective ratings of vividness (and effort)
were analyzed by constructing type II receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curves for each participant on each day of training.
This method of assessing metacognitive ability is derived from
signal detection methods (Swets, 1986; Macmillan and Creelman,
1991; Galvin et al., 2003; Kornbrot, 2006) and has been success-
fully employed in a variety of recent inquiries about metacognition
(Fleming et al., 2010; Song et al., 2011). Essentially, the only differ-
ence between type I and type II tasks lies in the event that is being
discriminated: Type I decisions are about the occurrence of events
independent of the observer (so, distinguishing between signal and
noise), whereas type II decisions are about whether a decision was
correct or incorrect (so, making a metacognitive judgment).
Since it is not possible to be “correct” or “incorrect” about
an internally generated image, we adapted the definition of the
type II decision to include judgments about the vividness of
single episodes of mental imagery and its effect on the per-
ceptual outcome during brief instances of subsequent binocular
rivalry. Applying the signal detection logic, we categorized trials
where participants reported high vividness and where imagery
subsequently biased perception as “hits.” Trials where partici-
pants reported high vividness but perception was not subsequently
biased were categorized as “false alarms.” Here, the ROC II char-
acterizes the probability of a participant being perceptually biased
during rivalry, given a certain level of self-reported vividness.
To construct the ROC II curves, we calculated p(rating= i |
perceptual bias) and p(rating= i | no perceptual bias) for all i,
and transformed these into cumulative probabilities before plot-
ting them against each other (anchored at [0,0] and [1,1]).
Distribution-free methods were employed to characterize type
II ROC sensitivity by calculating the area under the ROC curve
(Aroc), and type II ROC bias (Broc). These parameters are derived
from simple geometry and do not make assumptions about the
shape of the distribution (Kornbrot, 2006). The area under the
ROC curve (Aroc) quantifies the extent to which metacogni-
tive judgments are predictive of perceptual bias during rivalry
(Figure 1B); a diagonally flat ROC function indicates little pre-
dictive value of the metacognitive judgment on the subsequent
perceptual outcome during rivalry. The area under the ROC curve
is the sum of the area of the half-square triangle (dark-gray shaded
region in Figure 1B) and the area between the diagonal and the
ROC function (light-gray shaded region in Figure 1B):
Aroc = 0.25
4∑
i=1
[(
hi+1 − fi
)2 − (hi − fi+1)2]+ 0.5 (1)
The bias of the ROC II curve (Broc) was defined as the ratio
K B/KA, where K B is the area between the ROC curve and the
major diagonal (dashed line in Figure 1B) to the right of the
minor diagonal (dotted line in Figure 1B), and KA is the area
between the ROC curve and the major diagonal to the left of the
minor diagonal. A neutral bias would give Broc equal to zero, while
a negative or positive Broc indicates a bias toward lower or higher
ratings respectively.
Broc = ln

0.25
2∑
i=1
[(
hi+1 − fi
)2 − (hi − fi+1)2]
0.25
4∑
i=3
[(
hi+1 − fi
)2 − (hi − fi+1)2]
 (2)
Previous research has shown that subjective ratings of vivid-
ness – but not effort – are predictive of how much perceptual bias
someone experiences (Pearson et al., 2011). To confirm this, we
also applied the ROC II methods described above to participant’s
ratings of exerted effort. This effort-based ROC thus characterizes
the probability of a participant being perceptually biased given a
certain level of self-reported effort. Finally, to determine whether
the ROC II model did a good job accounting for our metacognitive
data, we fit a linear regression model:
z (h) = β0 + β1z
(
f
)+ ε (3)
Where z is the inverse of the cumulative normal distribu-
tion function. The ROC II model provided a good fit to the
self-reported vividness (mean R2= 0.976± 0.004) and effort data
(mean R2= 0.981± 0.007).
RESULTS
IMAGERY TRAINING
Sustained mental imagery can bias the perception of an ambigu-
ous display, resulting in a reliable measure of imagery strength on
a trial-to-trial basis (Pearson et al., 2008, 2011). When people rate
their imagery as more vivid, the likelihood that imagery influences
perception is larger (Pearson et al., 2011). Thus, if training men-
tal imagery would result in more vivid images, one would expect
to see an increase of perceptual bias over time. Figure 2 shows
the mean imagery strength (or “perceptual bias”) as a function of
days of training and again 2 weeks later. A within-subjects ANOVA
revealed that training did not increase the amount of perceptual
bias over time [F (5,40) < 1].
Mental imagery did bias perception in favor of the imagined
grating [F (5,40)= 8.861; p= 0.018] which is consistent with pre-
vious work demonstrating the effect of mental imagery on rivalry
(Pearson et al., 2008, 2011). Unsurprisingly – considering the
lack of a training effect – gratings of both trained and untrained
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FIGURE 2 | Imagery biased perception during rivalry in favor of the
previously imagined grating, but this perceptual bias did not
significantly change over the course of a 5-day training. The blue line
represents the mean training data, and the blue shaded regions represent
±1 SEM. The parts of the plot depicted in red represent data from blocks
where we tested training generalization to other orientations.
(generalization) orientations yielded similar perceptual biases: a
within-subjects ANOVA for training days 1, 5, and follow-up
revealed no main effect of orientation [F (1,8) < 1]. Analyzing the
data by session did not unveil any hidden differences in perceptual
bias over time [F (11,88)= 1.106; p= 0.366], which excludes the
possibility that most learning took place between the first couple
of sessions.
Additional evidence that mental imagery was not improved
by training comes from participant’s introspective judgments
of imagery vividness. Mean self-reported vividness of men-
tal imagery was statistically the same on all days of training
[F (5,40)= 1.224; p= 0.316]. Self-reports of exerted effort did not
change over the course of training either [F (5,40) < 1]. In summary,
neither the perceptual measure of imagery strength (“perceptual
bias”) nor ratings of vividness showed any significant change over
the 5-days of training. Thus, it appears that training in this study
was unable to increase imagery strength over time.
CATCH TRIALS
Catch trials were presented in a randomly interleaved fashion on
10% of all experimental trials, to determine whether observers
showed response bias in favor of the imagined grating. On these
trials, a mock rivalry display was presented consisting of a balanced
physical combination of the green and red gratings shown to both
eyes simultaneously. If the effects observed during rivalry were due
to decisional bias or demand characteristics, we expect to find the
same degree of response bias on catch trials. We analyzed bias by
coding veridical“mixed”responses to the catch trials as 50%, while
responses that matched the cued pattern were coded as 100%, and
responses opposite to the cued grating were coded as 0%. The
percentage of catch trials during which participant’s responses
were biased in favor of the cued grating are shown in Figure 3
(for all days of training). On average, this bias was 50.79%. This
indicates that demand characteristics and decisional bias have a
negligible influence on participant’s reports of rivalry dominance,
as previously documented (Pearson et al., 2011).
METACOGNITIVE JUDGMENTS
To assess whether people’s metacognitive insights about imagery
strength improve over the course of training, we constructed ROC
II curves for each individual observer, on each day of training
(Figure 4; Materials and Methods). The extent to which metacog-
nitive judgments of vividness predict perceptual bias was quan-
tified as the area under each ROC II curve. Data presented in
Figure 4 demonstrate that on earlier days of training (darker green
lines) the area under the curve is smaller than on later days of
training (lighter green lines). The upward bowing profile of the
curves observable in over half of our participants demonstrates
that vividness judgments indeed predict perceptual bias.
There is a clear trend toward more metacognitive abil-
ity over time for both the trained [F (5,40)= 1.742; p= 0.147]
and untrained (generalization) orientation [F (2,16)= 7.416;
p= 0.005]. Trained and untrained orientations do not statisti-
cally differ [F (1,8) < 1]. This lack of orientation specificity may
not be surprising considering that metacognition for perception
is something presumably supported by higher-level frontal areas
of the brain (Fleming et al., 2010), where responses are invariant
to fine-grained orientation information. Hence, we simplified our
analysis by collapsing the data from all orientations before con-
structing the ROC II curves as displayed in Figure 4. Estimates of
the type II ROC sensitivity Aroc are therefore slightly more reliable
on day 1, day 5, and during follow-up, since they are constructed
based on more data.
The information from Figure 4 is summarized in Figure 5,
showing the main effect of training: vividness judgments pre-
dict perceptual bias increasingly better over time [F (5,40)= 3.075;
p= 0.019]. This trend is linear when only looking at training
days 1–5 [F (1,8)= 5.846; p= 0.042] but becomes quadratic when
follow-up is included [F (1,8)= 8.778; p= 0.018], indicating a drop
of the proportion Aroc at follow-up. Nevertheless, planned com-
parisons (uncorrected t -tests) show that – with the exception of
day 1 – the predictive value of self-reported vividness on the per-
ceptual outcome is larger than would be expected by chance (one-
tailed one-sample t -test day 1: p= 0.243; all others: p< 0.029),
and this ability is still present 2–3 weeks after training (p= 0.021).
In previous work we demonstrated that people can reliably
evaluate the vividness of their mental imagery from one trial
to the next (Pearson et al., 2011). Participants in that previous
study were tested only once. Thus, one might expect to find evi-
dence for metacognition of imagery strength on day 1 of training
in the current experiment. However, the difference in analyses
used to determine metacognition in our previous and current
work (within-subjects analysis of variance, and area under ROC II
curve respectively), make it hard to directly compare the findings.
A within-subjects analysis of variance performed on the current
data shows that on day 1 of training, participants marginally (but
not significantly) showed a main effect of vividness on perceptual
bias [F (3,15)= 2.83; p= 0.074]. However, a lack of observed power
(0.558) indicates that at this sample size there is only a small (44%)
chance of finding a significant effect (at α= 0.05) when assuming
that people have metacognitive insights into their own imagery
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FIGURE 3 | Mean percentage of catch trials on which participant’s response to the fake-rivalry display was biased in favor of the imagined grating. A
score of 50% indicates a lack of bias. Gray shaded areas show each individual participant, the colored bars represent the 5 days of training plus follow-up
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FIGURE 4 | Participant’s metacognition of imagery over the course of training. ROC II curves based on the vividness ratings reported by our participants
(collapsed over Gabor orientations). Each plot represents an individual participant; the colored lines represent the ROC curves for the different days of training.
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strength at the population level. An a priori power analysis indi-
cates that, assuming a medium effect size, 21 subjects would be
required to obtain a power of 0.95.
Vividness ratings are predictive of the efficacy that mental
imagery has at biasing the perception of rivaling stimuli. By
contrast, self-reported effort for imagery was not hypothesized to
predict perceptual bias. Attempts to exert greater effort do not nec-
essarily result in highly effective imagery, as demonstrated by pre-
vious work (Pearson et al., 2011). To ensure that our findings were
specific to introspective vividness – and not effort – we constructed
ROC II curves (as in Figure 4; Materials and Methods) based on
the effort ratings reported by our participants. The pooled (across
participants) curves per day are shown in Figure 6A; the diagonally
flat function indicates a weak link between self-reported effort rat-
ings and perceptual bias during rivalry. Figure 6B demonstrates
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FIGURE 5 | Imagery metacognition improves over the course of
training. The extent to which self-reported vividness predicts perceptual
bias (quantified as the area under the ROC II curve after collapsing all
grating orientations, as also shown in Figure 4) plotted against day of
training. Shaded areas represent ±1 SEM.
that, as expected, effort did not predict perceptual bias [F (1,8) < 1].
The area under the ROC II curve (Aroc), which quantifies the
degree to which self-reported effort predicts perceptual bias during
rivalry, did not differ from chance on any of the training days (two-
tailed one-sample t -tests all p> 0.081). Neither did we observe a
change over time for the trained [F (5,40) < 1], untrained (general-
ized) [F (2,16)= 2.711; p= 0.097], or collapsed [F (5,40) < 1] grating
orientations.
Vividness appears to predict perceptual bias more strongly over
the course of training, whereas effort does not predict perceptual
bias at all. Can this finding be explained by the way participants
used the rating scales? Participant’s average reported vividness
(2.57± 0.21) and effort (2.86± 0.14) did not significantly dif-
fer (p= 0.261). In other words, subjective vividness – but not
effort – is predictive of how well something was imagined inde-
pendent of rating-magnitude. Signal detection theory considers
metacognitive ability (sensitivity) and rating-magnitude (bias) as
two independent properties (Galvin et al., 2003). In accordance
with this notion, we find that individuals with higher self-reported
vividness were not better at evaluating their imagery strength
and vice versa. Specifically, participant’s ability to make accurate
metacognitive judgments of their mental imagery (Aroc vivid-
ness) and participant’s mean vividness ratings were not correlated
(r = 0.063; p= 0.873).
The type II bias of the ROC curve (Broc) provides us with a
distribution-free estimate of the criterion used by participants to
provide their subjective ratings. A neutral bias would give Broc
equal to zero, while a negative or positive Broc indicates a bias
toward lower or higher ratings respectively. This estimate corre-
sponded very well with the actual rating-magnitude collected dur-
ing the experiment: self-reported vividness ratings and estimated
vividness bias (Broc vividness) were highly correlated (r = 0.913;
p< 0.001), as were self-reported effort and estimated effort bias
(r = 0.889; p= 0.001). The close resemblance between these two
variables – both measures of participant’s criterion – helps validate
the distribution-free approach used to determine ROC estimates
in the current paradigm.
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FIGURE 6 | Participant’s self-reported effort with which the
gratings were imagined does not predict perceptual bias. (A) ROC
II curves based on the effort ratings pooled across participants. Green
colored lines represent the different days of training. The diagonally flat
functions indicate a weak link between self-reported effort ratings and
perceptual bias during rivalry. (B) The extent to which self-reported
effort predicts perceptual bias (quantified as the area under the ROC II
curve) plotted against each day of training. Self-reported effort does not
predict perceptual bias, and this does not change over time. Data was
collapsed over Gabor orientations, since outcomes did not differ
between the two sets of orientations [F (1,8) <1]. Shaded areas
represent ±1 SEM.
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Strikingly, Figure 4 shows large differences between individu-
als: the degree to which metacognitive vividness judgments predict
perceptual bias varies quite a bit from one person to the next
(Aroc= 0.48–0.71). This type of variability is not uncommon, and
previous studies have reported similarly large individual differ-
ences in metacognitive ability for perceptual tasks (Song et al.,
2011). Besides large differences related to metacognition, also the
overall amount of perceptual bias experienced by our partici-
pants varied widely (46–76%). Nonetheless, participant’s overall
metacognitive ability and the percent perceptual bias they experi-
enced throughout the experiment, were uncorrelated (r =−0.027;
p= 0.945). This suggests that participant’s metacognitive ability
in this task is independent of imagery strength, as measured by
binocular rivalry.
DISCUSSION
The research presented here suggests that mental imagery strength
does not improve over the course of our 5-day training regime.
Over the 5-days, no changes were observed relating to imagery
strength as measured by rivalry, nor were there any changes in
the average introspective judgments of imagery vividness. We fur-
ther demonstrated that self-reported vividness of mental imagery
predicts the perceptual consequences of single epochs of imagery.
More importantly, this prediction becomes stronger with practice,
implying increased metacognition of imagery over the course of
training. Self-reported effort of mental imagery on the other hand,
did not predict perceptual outcomes.
There have been reports of visual imagery increasing perfor-
mance on subsequent perceptual tasks (Tartaglia et al., 2009). Yet
we were unable to find an increase in facilitation of rivalry domi-
nance after 5 days of training. The question is of course, why? The
emphasis of the research presented here was on improving imagery
strength over time. This is a notably different emphasis from stud-
ies that have investigated how imagery training changes perceptual
skills (Tartaglia et al., 2009). One obvious explanation for the lack
of an imagery training effect in this study is that imagery strength
simply cannot improve with practice. This idea is corroborated
by the fact that neither imagery bias, nor subjective ratings of
imagery strength showed a significant increase as a function of
training. Introspective ratings of imagery strength are reflected
in the perceptual outcomes during rivalry, and the close relation-
ship between the two implies they measure the same underlying
construct (Pearson et al., 2011). Thus, several aspects of the data
support the hypothesis that it is not possible – or very difficult – to
improve imagery strength by means of training.
The idea that training cannot easily change imagery strength
might be explained by the manner in which imagery strength is
linked to brain anatomy. The Tartaglia study (Tartaglia et al., 2009)
had participants repetitively imagine the crucial part of a bisection
stimulus (spatial judgment) or a low-contrast Gabor pattern (con-
trast judgment). They found improved perceptual performance
on a subsequent perceptual bisection task and a Gabor detection
task after imagery training, and this improvement generalized to
untrained orientations. This lack of orientation specificity implies
that learning through imagery did not involve plastic changes in
early visual cortex, but probably involved higher-level extra-striate
areas. Higher-level changes may boost perceptual performance
through imagery training, yet, changes at this cortical level may
not be sufficient to improve imagery strength itself.
Historically, mental imagery has been considered a fainter form
of perception (Hume, 1739). Evidence to support this notion
comes from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) stud-
ies demonstrating that the magnitude of brain activity is lower
during imagery than during bottom-up perception (Goebel et al.,
1998; O’Craven and Kanwisher, 2000). Likewise, single neuron
recordings in the medial temporal lobe of humans found fewer
neurons that were recruited during imagery than during per-
ception, and that the firing rate of these cells was lower during
imagery compared to perception (Kreiman et al., 2000). In the
case of perceptual bias during rivalry, imagery is presumed to
influence or boost the memory trace that exists between one
rivalry presentation and the next, and the location and orienta-
tion specificity of this memory trace implies that it is composed
of primarily low-level characteristics (Ishai and Sagi, 1995; Pear-
son et al., 2008; Slotnick, 2008). Mechanisms such as a gain in
sensitivity for the imagined pattern, or the strengthening of sen-
sory traces, would be needed to modify population activity in
lower visual areas mediating alternations of conscious percep-
tion during rivalry. Imagery may simply lack sufficient impact
to induce permanent plastic changes at these lowest sensory levels.
Future research directions aiming to improve imagery strength
could investigate the necessity of bottom-up information for
learning. Specifically, it would be interesting to see if there is a
transfer from improving visual perception by means of prolonged
training with actual sensory stimuli, to improvements of imagery
strength.
One could hypothesize that imagery strength is liable to
improvement, but we simply failed to find any in this study due to
the configuration of our task. Research into the process of improv-
ing perceptual skill – or perceptual learning – provides useful con-
text in support of this hypothesis. One influential view known as
the reverse hierarchy theory (Ahissar and Hochstein, 2004), states
that learning is gated by top-down, task-related factors: Learning
begins at high-level areas of the brain, after which it trickles down
the hierarchy, fine-tuning the read out from lower level areas. This
theory invokes a number of detailed predictions, namely, early
(fast) learning should be related to high-level changes, whereas
asymptotic (slow) learning should involve plasticity in low-level
sensory areas – if required by the task. There is considerable evi-
dence supporting this view (Ahissar and Hochstein, 1993, 1997;
Dosher and Lu, 1998; Dupuis-Roy and Gosselin, 2007).
In light of the reverse hierarchy framework, our training regime
is suspect to a critical vulnerability. Namely: training duration. Five
days may have been insufficient time to reach the asymptotic learn-
ing phase. The Tartaglia study previously mentioned (Tartaglia
et al., 2009) trained participant’s imagery for 10 days, twice as long
as in our study, and found an improvement on perceptual tasks.
Assuming that specific cellular plastic processes at the hierarchical
level of ocular dominance columns can only occur during asymp-
totic learning, longer training might be necessary when aiming to
influence rivalry perception.
Recent research has demonstrated that perceptual learning can
also occur without a specific task and outside of awareness, as
long as the information of interest is paired with feedback or
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a reward signal (Seitz and Watanabe, 2003, 2005; Seitz et al.,
2009) or with online-feedback via decoded fMRI signals (Shi-
bata et al., 2011). Our experimental design lacked a direct reward
signal. Perhaps if successful epochs of imagery were paired
with a reward signal, this could facilitate learning. In practice
the implementation of a reward may prove difficult to realize.
Often, measures of imagery strength are dependent on subjec-
tive reports, and offering rewards based on only self-reports
could induce strong response and observer biases. Neverthe-
less, it is possible that our training was insufficient to obtain an
effect, and providing feedback, rewards, or some manner of get-
ting participants to intentionally try and increase their imagery
strength, could have been a more effective way to train mental
imagery.
During memory consolidation, initially fragile memory traces
become stabilized due to practice-induced plasticity in task rele-
vant brain areas (Karni,1996; Dudai,2004). Can the ineffectiveness
of imagery training be due to somehow disrupted memory consol-
idation? Classically, consolidation has been defined as a time lim-
ited process directly following learning (Dudai, 2004). However,
recent studies indicate that interference is rather time indepen-
dent, and can occur at long intervals after training (Goedert and
Willingham, 2002; Caithness et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2008). Inter-
ference can be considered strongly stimulus dependent, resulting
from similarity between the learned and interfering stimulus, and
the corresponding neuronal populations recruited by these stimuli
(Seitz et al., 2005; Been et al., 2011). Specifically, for Gabor pat-
terns most interference occurs when interfering stimuli differ from
the learned orientation by 30˚, while no interference is observed
from orthogonal orientations (Been et al., 2011). Considering the
orthogonal training orientations of our experiment, disruption of
consolidation seems an unlikely explanation for the ineffectiveness
of imagery training.
Can people become better at knowing their own thoughts? We
were able to improve subject’s ability to judge the vividness of their
imagery. This improvement was still present during a follow-up
test, implying a long lasting effect of training on metacognitive
evaluation of mental imagery. Furthermore, training of metacog-
nition was not orientation specific: metacognition was improved
for both trained and untrained sets of orientations. It is likely
that the improvement of metacognition reported here originates
from higher-level brain areas. This is in concordance with the
suspected high-level neural locus of metacognitive ability for per-
ception (Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Fleming
et al., 2010) as well as the idea that networks in high-level cortical
regions orchestrate strategic choices during early learning, allocat-
ing attention and motivation in response to specific task demands
(Willingham, 1999; Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002; Doyon et al.,
2003).
Our study demonstrated improvements of the metacogni-
tion of imagery, whereas no changes in imagery strength itself
were observed. This dissociation suggests distinct brain mech-
anisms underlying metacognition and visual imagery respec-
tively. Similar distinctions have been made regarding metacogni-
tion of perception: Neuroanatomical substrates of introspective
ability are distinct from those supporting primary perception
(Fleming et al., 2010), and there is a marked dissociation between
metacognitive ability and performance on visual perceptual tasks
(Lau and Passingham, 2006; Lau, 2008; Rounis et al., 2010; Song
et al., 2011). Thus, metacognitive ability can be viewed as a stable
and task independent cognitive process that can be improved with
practice, independent of performance on other tasks. Changes
in high-level neuronal populations are likely candidates for this
learning.
The ability to introspect on private thoughts is key to human
subjective experience. Yet, people’s ability to evaluate internally
generated experiences – such as imagery – is not as self-evident as it
may appear. Although a large number of studies now demonstrate
that something as private as a mental image can be successfully
studied from a third-person perspective (Ishai and Sagi, 1995,
1997; Kosslyn et al., 2001; Pearson et al., 2008; Tartaglia et al.,
2009), research has only recently begun to tackle issues related
to the first-person perspective (Pearson et al., 2011). The core
problem from the first-person perspective of the imaginer is that
self-generated instances of imagery, unlike perception, cannot be
directly compared with a perceptual template. Nevertheless, peo-
ple seem quite capable of knowing if a mental image is accurate,
vivid, or detailed. And practice further improves this first-person
introspective ability. Why might such metacognitive knowledge be
important?
Introspective or “metacognitive” sensitivity is important to
guide actions and to make decisions (Vickers, 1979; Daw et al.,
2005; Dayan and Daw, 2008) and being able to adequately esti-
mate ones confidence can help drive adaptive behavior (Kepecs
et al., 2008). In its simplest form, low confidence that a recent
decision was correct may prompt reexamination of the evidence,
or seeking a second-opinion. In the event of internally gener-
ated experiences such as mental imagery, low confidence that an
image was veridical and life-like may lead someone to recon-
sider such an experience. A better metacognitive understanding
may help the imaginer bridge the gap between first and third-
person perspective. For example, people can resolve potential
ambiguities about perception by comparing their own percep-
tual experience with the subjective experience of another person
(Bahrami et al., 2010). Similarly, when the imaginer has a better
understanding of the authenticity of his or her mental image, it
will be easier to communicate its content to another person. In
sum, increasing the efficiency with which people introspect the
quality of their mental images can prove a novel and important
finding.
In conclusion, we discussed a variety of reasons why train-
ing did not lead to an improvement of imagery strength in the
current study. Such an improvement may simply be very dif-
ficult to document, or our task may not have been optimally
suited to detect improvements of imagery strength. Neverthe-
less, we demonstrated that people’s ability to introspect their
own imagery strength does improve with training, which sug-
gests distinct mechanisms underlying imagery and metacognition.
Being able to improve metacognition by means of practice can
have important implications for real-life situations. It would be
interesting to know if training metacognition could help people
improve certain cognitive functions, such as decision-making or
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planning actions. If so, this may prove especially helpful for specific
patient populations. Finally, future investigations of prolonged
training of imagery can prove advantageous in outlining the over-
lap between mechanisms of perception and imagery. Imagery as
defined here is a highly voluntary process that allows introspec-
tion in the absence of direct perceptual input. As such, imagery
can provide a unique gateway to understanding how perceptual
and introspective processes are represented in the brain.
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